Striking a Balance: The Conflict between Safety and Due Process Rights - The Practical Implications of Zadvydas v. Davis by Brown, Alicia
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 6
10-15-2002
Striking a Balance: The Conflict between Safety
and Due Process Rights - The Practical
Implications of Zadvydas v. Davis
Alicia Brown
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Human Rights Law
Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alicia Brown, Striking a Balance: The Conflict between Safety and Due Process Rights - The Practical Implications of Zadvydas v. Davis, 22 J.
Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges. (2002)
available at http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol22/iss2/6
Striking a Balance: The Conflict between Safety and
Due Process Rights-The Practical Implications of
Zadvydas v. Davis
Alicia Brown*
"Life without liberty is like a body without spirit."'
"Justice delayed is justice denied." 2
"Of all the powers of government, the power to incarcerate is second
only to the power to take a life.",3
I. INTRODUCTION
Picture this: your child is murdered by a resident alien in the
United States. The alien serves his sentence, and the United States
wishes to deport him. However, no country will take the alien back.
Do you want the alien released back into the general population of
the United States? Conversely, place yourself in the position of the
alien. He has served the sentence given to him, yet no country will
take him in. Should he be forced to wait in jail indefinitely when
* J.D. candidate, 2003, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A., 2000,
University of California, San Diego. Ms. Brown wishes to thank her family for
their support. Thanks also to Professor Ogden, who suggested this case to Journal
members as a possible paper topic. In addition, special thanks to Nathan Newman
for encouragement, advice and a place (both physical and mental) to write this
paper.
1. Kahlil Gibran, at http://www.quoteland.com/author.asp?AUTHORID=79
(last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
2. William E. Gladstone, at http://www.quoteland.com/topic.asp?
CATEGORYID=88 (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
3. Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1838,
1841 (2002).
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deportation does not appear likely? How is the alien's interest in
liberty to be balanced with the general population's interest in safety?
The Supreme Court's ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis4 affects how and
when aliens who cannot be deported are released back into the
United States. This note explores the Zadvydas decision. Part II
details the facts and procedural history of the case.5 Part III analyzes
the majority opinion by Justice Breyer, as well as the dissenting
opinions, of Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 6  Part IV considers
Zadvydas' legislative, judicial, administrative and social impact.7





The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall .. .be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
."9 The Supreme Court has ruled that the Fifth Amendment's right of
due process applies to aliens in deportation proceedings.10 The
debate over the past century has surrounded what rights due process
entails, rather than if due process applies to aliens in deportation
proceedings. This historical background will sketch a history of the
4. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
5. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
6. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
7. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
8. See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (holding that:
Therefore, it is not competent for the Secretary of the
Treasury or any executive officer, at any time within the year
limited by the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has
entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to
its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged
to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported
without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the
questions involving his right to be and remain in the United
States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the
principles involved in due process of law are recognized).
22-2
development of due process rights as applied to aliens in deportation
proceedings.
The Fifth Amendment does not require that people be citizens for
due process rights to extend to them." Therefore, aliens are entitled
to due process rights in deportation proceedings.' 2  In the pre-
twentieth century United States, aliens were afforded considerably
fewer rights than they are today.' 3 A turning point in pre-twentieth
century alien due process rights was the Dred Scott decision.' 4 In
that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the rights awarded in the Bill
of Rights extended only to citizens of the United States.' 5 The Court
ruled that where the Constitution gave rights to people, the word
"people" meant citizen.16  The adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment gave non-citizens, including aliens, rights beyond which
they had enjoyed prior to that point.' 7 The Fourteenth Amendment
stresses that non-citizens are entitled to the Fifth Amendment rights
of due process.' 
8
Early Supreme Court decisions on the rights of aliens "protected
the interests of aliens without holding that they had constitutional
rights."' 19 At the time of early Supreme Court decisions, there was no
11. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1896) (holding that:
The term "person," used in the fifth amendment, is broad
enough to include any and every human being within the
jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled
to the same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled
to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he
is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the
equal protection of those laws).
12. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100.
13. See Jim Rosenfeld, Comment, Deportation Proceedings and Due Process
of Law, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 713 (1995) (providing a detailed discussion
of colonial American treatment toward aliens and the development of alien rights in
the United States).
14. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 584-86 (1856).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 728.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
19. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 730.
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federal deportation statute and states primarily handled deportations,
so the Court did not use the Bill of Rights to award rights to aliens.2°
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Court began to hear cases on
alien due process rights. In 1886, in the Yick Wo v. Hopkins case, the
Court ruled that Fifth Amendment due process was given to anyone
within the United States.21 In Wong Wing v. United States, the Court
ruled that aliens were persons under the Fifth Amendment, and so
entitled to Fifth Amendment protection.22
In the 1880's and 1890's, the Court decided two important cases
with regard to alien due process rights. In Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, the Court ruled that the federal government had power over
immigration cases. 23 In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court
ruled that the federal government had power over deportation cases.24
The Court ruled in Fong Yue Ting that aliens were entitled to due
process rights in their deportation hearings. 25 These two decisions
20. Id.
21. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S 356, 369 (1886) (holding that "[t]he
questions we have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore, are to be treated
as involving the rights of every citizen of the United States equally with those of
the strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court").
22. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that:
The term "person," used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad
enough to include any and every human being within the
jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled
to the same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled
to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he
is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the
equal protection of those laws).
23. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (holding:
That the government of the United States, through the action
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its
territory is a proposition which we do not think open to
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its
independence).
24. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (holding that
"[t]he power of the government to exclude foreigners from the country, whenever,
in its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in
repeated instances, and never denied by the executive or legislative departments").
25. Id. at 730.
awarded the federal government plenary power (total control) over
alien deportation.
A new upsurge of alien due process cases arose during the mid-
twentieth century. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, the Court ruled that
the federal government retained the power to end an alien's stay in
the United States.26 In Galvan v. Press, the Court ruled that alien due
process rights were not violated because Congress retained the power
to regulate the deportation of immigrants. 27  In Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, the Court ruled that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") could keep a returning alien out of the
United States without a hearing, and if the alien could not be
deported, they could be detained indefinitely. 28 In the Shaughnessy
v. Pedreiro case, the Court ruled that deportation orders could be
reviewed in actions brought in federal district court under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").29
26. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952) (holding that:
Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an
equal footing with citizens, but in others has never been
conceded legal parity with the citizen. Most importantly, to
protract this ambiguous status within the country is not his
right but is a matter of permission and tolerance. The
Government's power to terminate its hospitality has been
asserted and sustained by this Court since the question first
arose).
27. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (holding that:
Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right
to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political
conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies,
the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the
procedural safeguards of due process. But that the
formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to
Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the
legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any
aspect of our government).
28. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214-16 (1953).
29. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955) (holding that:
It is more in harmony with the generous review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act to construe the ambiguous
word "final" in the 1952 Immigration Act as referring to
finality in administrative procedure rather than as cutting off
the right of judicial review in whole or in part. And it would
Fall 2002 Striking a Balance
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In more recent cases, beginning primarily in the 1970's, the
Supreme Court has been moving away from plenary power and
adopting "a new approach to the role of due process in all types of
administrative hearings."30 In 1982, the Court ruled in Landon v.
Plasencia that aliens could invoke the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause in deportation proceedings. 31 The Court handed down United
States v. Salerno in 1987, ruling that government detention violates
the Due Process Clause unless the detention occurs in a criminal
proceeding with adequate procedural protections.32 In 1992, the
Court explained that detention in special, non-punitive situations
would not violate due process, provided the government shows the
detainee is mentally ill and dangerous. 33  The Court has also
suggested that it may be unconstitutional for administrative body
certainly not be in keeping with either of these Acts to
require a person ordered deported to go to jail in order to
obtain review by a court).
30. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 737.
31. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (holding that:
In challenging her exclusion in the District Court, Plasencia
argued not only that she was entitled to a deportation
proceeding but also that she was denied due process in her
exclusion hearing. We agree with Plasencia that under the
circumstances of this case, she can invoke the Due Process
Clause on returning to this country...) (citation omitted).
32. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987) (holding that:
Detainees have a right to counsel at the detention hearing.
They may testify in their own behalf, present information by
proffer or otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses who
appear at the hearing. The judicial officer charged with the
responsibility of determining the appropriateness of
detention is guided by statutorily enumerated factors, which
include the nature and the circumstances of the charges, the
weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics of the
putative offender, and the danger to the community. The
Government must prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence. Finally, the judicial officer must include written
findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for a
decision to detain[) (citation omitted)].
33. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). See also Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1997) (ruling that if there is a special
justification, like mental illness, that outweighs an individual's interest against
detention, the government is justified in detaining the individual.).
rulings to definitively rule regarding an individual's fundamental
rights. 34 Zadvydas was decided under these cases.
B. Statutory Background
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA").35 The INA allowed the Attorney General "either to detain
or to release aliens during the six-month period following a final
removal order." 36  In the 1980's and 1990's, Congress began
legislating the detention and release of particular types of aliens more
closely.37 "Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act ("ADAA") of
1988, which required the detention of aliens convicted of an
aggravated felony." 38 When several courts found that this mandatory
detention violated the Due Process Clause, Congress amended the
statute to allow the release of aliens who could prove they had
entered the United States legally and were not a flight risk or
dangerous. 39
In response to the Oklahoma City bombings and the resulting
increased fear of terrorism, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
34. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450
(1985) (stating that "[t]he extent to which legislatures may commit to an
administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating
fundamental rights is a difficult question of constitutional law").
35. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
36. Developments in the Law: Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention
of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2002) (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1252(c) (2000)). The article notes that prior to 1952, the Immigration Act of 1917
had governed "the removal and detention of aliens." Id. at 1919 n.26 (citing
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, which stated aliens were to be
"taken into custody and deported"). The Immigration Act of 1917 was interpreted
as allowing government detention of non-citizens "for a reasonable period of time."
Id.
37. Id. at 1919-1921.
38. Id. at 1920 (citing Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102
Stat. 4181 (1988) and § 7343(a)(4), 102 Stat. at 4470 (amending 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a) (2000)). The regulations required that the INS hold felonious aliens in
custody during deportation proceedings and afterwards, until their removal. Id.
39. Id. (citing THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN &
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 886
(4th ed. 1998)).
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 199640 and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,4' which
"amended the INA to subject a broader category of aliens to
mandatory detention during removal proceedings and thereafter until
repatriation." 42  The amendments to the INA now require aliens
removable as a terrorist threat to be detained, with exceptions for
aliens in the witness protection program, or aliens who are not a
flight or security risk.43 Further, the amendments to the INA allow
the government ninety days to remove an alien after a final order of
repatriation.44 However, some aliens are not removable within the
ninety day period, so the INA allows the INS to continue detaining
"excludable aliens and aliens who pose a danger to the community or
represent a flight risk beyond the ninety day period. 45  In 2001,
after application of the INA's 1996 rule expanding the types of aliens
that can be detained pending repatriation, 3400 deportable aliens




Zadvydas v. Davis is the consolidation of two circuit court
cases. 4 7 The first case is that of Kestutis Zadvydas, an immigrant
from a displaced persons camp in Germany, who came to the United
40. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)).
41. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996)).
42. Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, supra note 3, at 1920-21
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000)).
43. Id. at 1920-21 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000)).
44. Id. at 1921 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000)).
45. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2002)).
46. Id. (citing Michelle Mittelstadt, INS Plans To Free Long-Term Detainees:
Home Countries Don't Want Immigrants Back, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 20,
2001, at A1).
47. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684 (2001); Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986
F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (E.D. La, 1997).
States in 1956.48 Zadvydas had a long criminal conviction history,
and in 1992, was convicted of a 1987 offense of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute in Virginia.4 9 Zadvydas served two
years, and immediately upon his release and probation, the INS took
him into custody and began deportation proceedings. 50  The INS
detained Zadvydas without bond, and at a bond hearing, Zadvydas
was denied bond by an Immigration Judge, who reasoned that
Zadvydas was a flight risk.51 The Board of Immigration Appeals
denied Zadvydas' appeal.52  On March 29, 1994, Zadvydas'
deportation hearing was held, and he was ordered deported to
Germany.53 The INS began proceedings to deport Zadvydas, but the
German government told the INS that Zadvydas was not a German
citizen, and that his parents were Lithuanian immigrants. 54  After
discovering this information, the INS detained Zadvydas indefinitely
(beyond the ninety-day removal period) because they could not find a
country that would take him. A magistrate judge recommended
that Zadvydas' request for habeas corpus relief be denied on the
grounds that indefinitely holding him pending deportation was
constitutional, but the district court granted his writ of habeas
corpus. 56 The INS appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 57  The Fifth Circuit held that Zadvydas' continued
48. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 684. See also Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986
F. Supp. at 1014 (E.D. La, 1997) (noting that Zadvydas' parents were from
Lithuania, though it is not apparent whether they were Lithuanian citizens, and that
Zadvydas was "admitted into the United States in connection with a program for
the relocation of displaced persons").
49. Zadvyas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. at 1014.
50. Id. at 1014-15 (noting that this was not the first time deportation
proceedings were instituted against Zadvydas. In fact, the INS had begun
deportation proceedings against him in 1977 after his 1966 conviction for
attempted third degree robbery and his 1974 conviction for third degree attempted
burglary).
51. Id. at 1015.
52. Id.
53. Id.




57. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
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detention was not a violation of his due process rights as long as
there were procedures to periodically review the detention and the
possibility of his obtaining citizenship in another country was not
obsolete.5 8 Zadvydas asked the Supreme Court to review the Fifth
Circuit's decision. 59  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
consolidated Zadvydas' case with Ma's, deciding them together.
60
2. Ma Case
Ma was consolidated with Zadvydas by the Supreme Court.6' In
1977, Kim Ho Ma was born in Cambodia. 62 Ma became a resident
alien in the United States at age seven.63 In 1996, Ma was convicted
of first degree manslaughter by a jury, and sentenced to thirty-eight
months in prison. 64 After twenty-six months, Ma was released, and
the INS took him into custody and began removal proceedings
against him. 65 The INS was not able to remove Ma within the ninety-
58. Id. at 296-97. The court emphasized that there were "two other potential
options.. ." for Zadvydas, that he could claim that he was German by birth, and
therefore demand German citizenship, and that he could claim Russian citizenship.
Id. at 293. The court found that since these two options had thus far gone
unexplored, they left the INS with viable options other than permanently and
indefinitely holding Zadvydas in custody, and therefore, the INS could hold him as
long as "good faith efforts to effectuate the alien's deportation continue and
reasonable parole and periodic review procedures are in place." Id. at 297. See
also Charles Lane & Hanna Rosin, Court Limits Detention of Immigrants; Justices
Rule Convicts Can't Be Held Indefinitely, WASHINGTON POST, June 29, 2001, at
Al (explaining that the Fifth Circuit analogized Zadvydas' situation to that of an
illegal immigrant who has been detained at the border).
59. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 686.
60. Id.; Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
61. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 686 (2001).
62. Id. at 685.
63. Id. (noting that Ma's family fled Cambodia when he was two, and arrived
in the United States in 1985 by way of refugee camps in Thailand and the
Philippines). See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that Ma
became a lawful permanent United States resident in 1987).
64. Ma, 208 F.3d at 819 (noting that the manslaughter charge stemmed from a
gang related incident).
65. Id. (noting that Ma was released early after "receiving credit for good
behavior," that Ma was tried as an adult, though he was a minor at the time the
crime was committed, and that the crime in question was Ma's only criminal
day period for removal, but they kept him in custody because they
feared that Ma was a danger to others. 66 Ma filed for a writ of habeas
corpus with the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Washington in 1999.67 The district court ruled that Ma had to be
released because the Constitution does not allow "post-removal-
period detention" unless there is a real possibility that the person
being held will be deported, and there was no possibility in Ma's case
that he would be deported.68 The INS appealed, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld Ma's release.
69
The Ninth Circuit found that aliens could not be held for more than a
reasonable time beyond the ninety-day detention period and that Ma
had been held beyond a reasonable time.70 The government asked
the Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit's decision, and the
Court granted a writ of certiorari, and consolidated Ma's case with
Zadvydas'. 7 '
conviction.) See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 685 (noting that Ma was ordered
removed because of his conviction for an "aggravated felony"). See, e.g., Cindy
Rodriguez, To Immigrant 'Lifers,' Prison Release is Overdue Many in New
England Held in Diplomatic Limbo, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 5, 2001 at B1
(discussing immigrants trapped in situations like that of Ma's). The article details
the situation of Anthony Budai and Nelson Davis, both immigrants who were
convicted of crimes, and at the time the article was written, had served their
sentence, but were being held indefinitely in prison beyond their sentence because
the United States had been unable to deport them. Id. Budhai is a legal immigrant
from Guyana who was convicted of attempted armed robbery, and served his four
year sentence. Id. At the time the article was written, he had served six years, two
extra years because the United States was unable to deport him. Id. Davis came to
the United States as a child refugee from Cuba, and had been held seventeen
months beyond his sentence because the United States has also been unable to
deport him. Id.
66. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 685-86 (noting that the INS was
particularly disturbed by Ma's gang membership and the violent nature of the crime
he was convicted of).
67. Ma v. INS, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
68. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 686 (noting that the district court found
there was no possibility that Ma would be deported because the United States has
no repatriation treaty with Ma's home country, Cambodia).
69. Ma, 208 F.3d at 831.
70. Id. at 818, 830-31 (noting that the reasonable time expired after ninety days
because the United States has no repatriation agreement with Cambodia).
71. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 686 (noting the Court granted certiorari to
Ma and Zadvydas to consider statutory and constitutional questions).
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III. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Majority
Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion for the court.72 He
began his analysis by explaining the removal process for aliens found
to be in the United States illegally and ordered removed.73 Justice
Breyer explained that once an alien has been given a final order of
removal, there is a ninety-day statutory removal period that the alien
is typically removed during. 74 However, if the government is unable
to remove the alien within the ninety-day period, there is a statute
that allows the government to hold the alien longer.75 The statute
allows further detention of the alien if they are, "determined by the
Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply
with the order of removal .... 76 The statute further says that if the
alien is released, he can be subject to terms of supervision as a
condition for his release. 7 Justice Breyer explained that the issue is
whether the "post-removal-period statute . . . " authorizes the
Attorney General to indefinitely detain an alien beyond the ninety-
day removal period, or if the statute only allows the Attorney General
72. Id. at 682-702. Justice Breyer was joined in his opinion by Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Ginsburg. Id. at 681.
73. Id. at 682.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(6) (2000)). "Except as otherwise provided
in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section
referred to as the 'removal period')." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000).
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section
1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been
determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal,
may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released,
shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000).
76. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000)).
77. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2000)).
to retain the alien "for a period reasonably necessary to secure the
alien's removal.",
78
Justice Breyer then addressed the procedures surrounding
removal of an alien and the ninety day detention period. 79  He
explains that once a final removal order has been issued, and the
ninety day detention period begins, the alien must be held in
custody.80 After the ninety day period expires, the government still
has the discretion to detain the alien, but is not required to.81 Justice
Breyer explained that the INS District Director reviews the alien's
history to decide whether further detention should be effected or
whether they should be released under supervision once the ninety
day detention period is up.82 If the Director decides to detain the
alien further, an INS panel will review the decision, following the
passing of a three month period.83 The panel then decides whether
the alien should be further detained or released.84 To release the
alien, "the panel must find that the alien is not likely to be violent, to
pose a threat to the community, to flee if released, or to violate the
conditions of release." 85  Justice Breyer states that if the panel
decides to keep the suspect in custody, they must review their
decision within a year, and can review it earlier upon a change of
conditions. 86
78. Id. (italics in original).
79. Id. at 683. (stating "[t]he post-removal-period detention statute is one of a
related set of statutes and regulations that govern detention during and after
removal proceedings").
80. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2000)).
81. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2000)).
82. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(c)(1), (h), (k)(1)(i) (2002)).
83. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(k)(2)(ii) (2002)).
84. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(i) (2002)). The Court notes the factors laid out
by 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(f)(2002) that the panel takes into account: "the alien's
disciplinary record, criminal record, mental health reports, evidence of
rehabilitation, history of flight, prior immigration history, and favorable factors
such as family ties. Id.
85. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e)(2002). The Court further explains that the
alien must demonstrate to the attorney general that they are not a flight risk, as per
the conditions in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1) (2002)). Id.
86. Id. at 683-84 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(k)(2)(iii)-(v) (2002)).
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Justice Breyer then explains the underlying facts for both
Zadvydas and Ma.87 Justice Breyer first establishes the Court's
jurisdiction over this case, pursuant to the federal habeas corpus
statute. 88 He cites the history of the federal courts involvement in
alien deportation 89 and concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas
corpus proceedings "remain available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to the post-removal-period detention." 90
Justice Breyer then explains that the post-removal-period detention
statute applied to "certain categories of aliens who have been ordered
removed ... " namely, aliens who in some way were thought to pose
a risk to the community around them.91 The government argues that
the post-removal-period detention statute "sets no limit on the time"
an alien can be held, and so gives the Attorney General and not the
courts the right to determine if an alien should continue being
detained, and if so, for how long.92 However, the majority opinion
cites precedent which states that when a congressional act raises
doubt as to its constitutionality, the Supreme Court will first
determine "whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided., 93 Justice Breyer explains that
in the past the Court has severely limited immigration statutes to
avoid ruling them unconstitutional. 94 Moreover, he says the majority
87. Id. at 684-86 (noting that the Court consolidated the two cases and will
consider them together).
88. Id. at 687 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 2241(c)(3) (2000)).
89. Id. (noting that before 1952, federal courts used habeas proceedings to
consider, "challenges to the lawfulness of immigration-related detention, including
challenges to the validity of a deportation order... "). From 1952 on, under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), there was an alternate method to review
deportation orders in district court. Id. (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreirro, 349 U.S.
48, 51-52 (1955)). In 1961, Congress got rid of APA district court review of
deportation orders, and gave the federal courts of appeals the right to review initial
deportation orders. Id. Throughout Congress' action on the issue of deportation
orders, habeas review was still the main method for reviewing continued custody
after a final deportation order. Id. (citing Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206,
212, 215-216 (1968)).
90. Id. at 688.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 689.
93. Id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
94. Id. (citing United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 195 (1957)).
22-2
of the Court reads the statute in question as limiting the post-removal
detention of an alien to a time "reasonably necessary to bring about
that alien's removal from the United States. [The statute] does not
permit indefinite detention." 95 Justice Breyer explains that a statute
that permits an alien to be detained indefinitely would violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.96 Justice Breyer
outlines the Court's precedent, which says that government detention
violates the Due Process Clause, "unless the detention is ordered in a
criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or, in
certain special and 'narrow' non-punitive 'circumstances' where a
special justification . . . outweighs the 'individual's constitutionally
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint."' 97  In this case,
Justice Breyer explains, we have a civil proceeding which is non-
punitive, so we need a special justification to outweigh Ma and
Zadvydas' constitutional protections against being held.98  The
government offers two justifications for the continued detention:
preventing flight of the aliens and protecting the community. 99 The
Court finds the first justification weak because removal of the aliens
was not likely.' 00 The Court says they have only upheld preventive
detention under the second justification, protecting the community,
where there is a particularly dangerous person and they are given
strong procedural protections.' 01
Justice Breyer notes that there is a possibility of permanent
confinement of the aliens. 10 2 Since there is no flight risk, the only
special circumstance is the fact that the alien is removable, which
95. Id.
96. Id. at 690.
97. Id. (citing, 481 U.S. at 746); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. at 80); Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (italics in original)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
101. Id. at 690-91 (noting that where cases of preventive detention are
potentially indefinite detention, they have typically held there should be a special
circumstance, such as a mental illness of the detainee, which helps create the
danger).
102. Id. at 692.
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bears no relation to how dangerous they are. 10 3 Justice Breyer also
notes that the procedural safeguards the statute offers aliens, an
administrative proceeding where the alien "bears the burden of
proving he is not dangerous, without . . . significant later judicial
review", are less than the procedural safeguards the Constitution
requires for property.104  Justice Breyer then reviews the
government's argument that alien status can justify indefinite
detention by itself.10 5  Justice Breyer counters that argument by
saying there is a difference between the case the government cites,
where the alien never entered United States soil, and the instant case,
where the aliens had lived in the United States for a number of
years. 0 6  When someone has entered the United States, they are
afforded the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, because it applies to all "persons" in the United States
without regard to their legal residency status.'0 7  The Court
distinguishes this rule of law to the ruling in Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 108 which the government uses in support of their
argument that the aliens in question are not required to be given
generous procedural safeguards. 10 9 In Mezei, Mezei was not given
the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
because Mezei never got to United States soil."0  Here, both
Zadvydas and Ma were present on United States soil and therefore
they are due the full protection of the Due Process Clause. 11
Justice Breyer then analyzes another argument by the government
"that Congress has 'plenary power' to create immigration law, and
that the judicial branch must defer to executive and legislative branch
103. Id. at 691-92.
104. Id. at 692 (citing South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 393 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
105. Id. at 692-93.
106. Id (citing 345 U.S. 206 (1953)).
107. Id. at 693 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269
(1990), Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) and Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 210 (1982)).
108. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206.
109. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 693-94 (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. 206).
110. Id. at 693 (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. 206).
111. Id. at 696.
decision making in that area."'"12  The opinion points out that
Congress' plenary power is subject to constitutional limitations, and
in prior cases, the Court has never denied Congress the right to
subject aliens to supervision, remove or incarcerate them in
appropriate situations.1 13  Justice Breyer says the question in the
instant case is whether aliens should be subject to indefinite
imprisonment in the United States if the government is unable to
remove them, not whether aliens can remain or who should be
removed." 4 The opinion also says that the case does not require the
court to decide which political branch controls entry into the United
States.115 Justice Breyer then states the Court is not going to consider
"terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments
might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened
deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect [to]
national security." 116
Justice Breyer then addresses the government's last argument that
any liberty interest the alien possesses is "greatly diminished"
because they lack the legal right to live in the United States.
1 7
However, the Court distinguishes a choice between the alien being in
112. Id. at 695.
113. Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983); Chae Chan Ping,
130 U.S. at 604)).
114. Id. at 694-96.
115. Id. at 695-96.
116. Id. This dicta by the Court is particularly timely in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. See Antiterrorism Legislation
Gains Momentum in Both Chambers; Lawmakers Offer Assorted Stand-Alone
Bills, Interpreter Releases, Oct. 2001 (discussing proposed anti-terrorism
legislation passed in the wake of September 1 Ith, and that lawmakers are being
forced to consider the Zadvydas ruling in writing legislation). The Court seems
to say they feel the threat of terrorism is a special circumstance where indefinite
or preventive detention would be more acceptable, and a situation where other
political branches should be given greater deference to make decisions. See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 696. Perhaps Congress, in passing new anti-
terrorism bills, read through the decision and realized the court will be more
likely to uphold indefinite and preventive detentions where there is a threat to
national security. See Antiterrorism Legislation Gains Momentum in Both
Chambers; Lawmakers Offer Assorted Stand-Alone Bills, Interpreter Releases,
Oct. 2001.
117. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 696.
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prison, or in the alternative, at large in the population in the United
States, and the situation here, where the alien is in prison or under
supervision as part of their release conditions which cannot be
violated. 118 Justice Breyer finds that in this case the alien has a
liberty interest that is strong enough to question the constitutionality
of indefinite detention." 9
The opinion says that disregarding all the other issues, the Court
must give effect to that intent if Congress has clearly stated its intent
in the controlling statute. 120 However, Justice Breyer finds no intent
by Congress to grant the Attorney General the power to indefinitely
confine an alien who is to be removed.121 Justice Breyer rejects the
government's argument that the use of the word "may" in the statute
shows the Attorney General had the discretion to hold aliens
indefinitely while trying to get them deported. 122 The opinion also
disputes the government's reading of the statute's history.' 23 Justice
Breyer finds nothing in the statutory history which would indicate
that Congress intended to allow indefinite or permanent detention,
and therefore, once removal does not seem likely, an alien cannot be
detained further. 24
The opinion then addresses the government's argument that,
under the statute, a federal habeas court is bound to accept "the
Government's view about whether the implicit statutory limitation is
satisfied in a particular case, conducting little or no independent
review of the matter."' 125 Justice Breyer counters the government's
argument, stating that federal habeas corpus statutes grant federal
courts authority to decide whether a detention is reasonably
118. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(3), 1253 (2000) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.5
(2002)).
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000)).
121. Id. at 697.
122. Id. (noting that if Congress wished to authorize indefinite detention of
aliens, they would have done so more clearly in the language of the statute).
123. Id. at 697-98.
124. Id. at 697-99.
125. Id. at 699.
necessary to secure removal or not.1 26 Justice Breyer says the duty of
the habeas court is to decide whether the detention of the alien in
question "exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal."1 27  If the court finds that removal of the alien is "not
reasonably foreseeable the court should . . ." find the detention
unreasonable and not statutorily authorized. 1
28
Justice Breyer then recognizes the power the Executive Branch
has in matters of foreign policy, and says the courts must "listen with
care . . . " when a foreign policy question arises, and "grant the
Government appropriate leeway when its judgments rest upon
foreign policy expertise."1 29  In order to limit the number of
judgments courts will need to make on executive leeway, the Court
will recognize a "presumptively reasonable period of detention. . . to
guide lower court determinations."'1 30 Justice Breyer says the Court
is adopting a six-month detention period, and once six months of
detention have passed, if an alien can show good reason that there is
no "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future . . . " the government must rebut their evidence, or the alien
will be released from custody. 131 The opinion makes clear that the
six-month presumption does not mean all aliens must be released
after six months, but rather that they must be held in custody until a
determination that there is not a "significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future."'1 32  The court then vacates the
126. Id. (stating that in deciding the question, the Court is fulfilling the
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus "to relieve detention by executive authorities
without judicial trial" (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson,
J., concurring))).
127. Id. (stating that the habeas court is to determine reasonableness in light of
the purpose of the statute-to assure the alien is present should the removal
happen).
128. Id. at 699-700 (stating that if the alien is released because the detention is
found to be unreasonable, his release should be supervised as authorized by statute,
and if the alien violates the terms of release, his should be detained again).
129. Id. at 700.
130. Id. at 701.
131. Id. (stating that "for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the 'reasonable foreseeable
future' conversely would have to shrink").
132. Id.
Fall 2002 Striking a Balance
448 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 22-2
decisions below for both Ma and Zadvydas and remands the cases for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion.' 
33
B. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion. 34 He begins by joining
in Part I of Justice Kennedy's dissent, which "establishes the
Attorney General's clear statutory authority to detain criminal aliens
with no specified time limit."' 35 Justice Scalia then states that he is
writing separately because he disagrees with Part II of Justice
Kennedy's dissent, which suggests there are some alien detention
situations where a court is authorized to order the alien's release. 136
Justice Scalia states that an illegal alien who has been ordered
removed from the United States cannot claim a constitutional right of
"supervised release" into the United States.' 37 Justice Scalia states
that since the alien has no legal right to be here, he cannot claim that
his freedom from physical restraint or indefinite detention is being
violated. 138 Justice Scalia feels the Court should have relied on the
133. Id. at 702.





138. Id. at 703-705 (citing the precedent of Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) in
which the Court, "upheld potentially indefinite detention of such an inadmissible
alien whom the government was unable to return anywhere else"). In Mezei, the
Court ruled that an alien was not deprived of any constitutional rights by indefinite
detention. Mezei, 345 U.S at 215. Justice Scalia emphasizes that while four
Justices dissented because they thought the alien deserved greater protection, no
Justice claimed the alien had a "substantive constitutional right to release into this
country." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 703. Justice Scalia notes that indeed the
dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice Frankfurter, stated
the exact opposite opinion, that due process gives aliens no right to remain in the
United States. Id. (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 222-23 (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
Justice Scalia explains that the Court in the instant case neither overrules nor
applies Mezei, but instead distinguishes it. Id. at 703-04. Justice Scalia then
standards of the Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei case to
rule in the instant case. 139 Justice Scalia then states what he feels was
Congress's intent: to give the same rights to an alien who has been
ordered removed from our country and an alien at the border seeking
entry.140 Justice Scalia charged that the majority opinion is in effect
giving greater due process rights to aliens ordered removed from our
country.' 41 Justice Scalia's dissent was premised on his belief that
Mezei was the appropriate standard, and that the authority granted by
Congress to the Attorney General was constitutional. 1
42
2. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
Justice Kennedy wrote a second dissent, which argues that the
majority is seeking to avoid a constitutional question. 143 He feels in
doing so, the Court interprets the statute without regard to Congress's
intent, and actually amends the statute itself. 144  Justice Kennedy
feels the majority is incorrectly providing the Judicial Branch with
power the Executive Branch alone should have, and that the majority
is allowing the release of possibly dangerous aliens into the public. 145
Justice Kennedy further states that the Court did not actually avoid a
constitutional question, but are meddling incorrectly with the balance
of powers, which raises serious constitutional concerns.1 46 Justice
dissects the majority opinion's distinguishing of Mezei, and concludes that the
majority does not effectively distinguish the instant case from Mezei. Id.
139. Id. at 705 (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)).
140. Id.
141. Id. (noting that Congress provided authority to detain aliens both at the
border and those ordered removed from the country in the same statutory provision,
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which shows that Congress thought the two groups should
have equal rights).
142. Id.
143. Id. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and joined in
Part I of his dissent by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 705-06 (noting that the Court is "raising serious constitutional
concerns not just for the cases at hand but for the Court's own view of its proper
authority").
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Kennedy ends his introduction by saying he dissents because he feels
the Court reaches the "wrong result[s] for the wrong reason."' 147
Justice Kennedy begins his argument by saying the Immigration
and Nationality Act ("INA") is straightforward, and gives the
Attorney General discretion to detain aliens ordered removed beyond
the ninety-day removal period. 148 Justice Kennedy states the issue:
"[W]hether the authorization to detain beyond the removal period is
subject to the implied, non-textual limitation that the detention be no
longer than reasonably necessary to effect removal to another
country." 149 The majority reads this limitation into the statute, but
Justice Kennedy rejects their interpretation and says it "contradicts
and defeats the purpose set forth in the express terms of the statutory
text."
'150
Justice Kennedy concludes that the majority undertakes an
inconsistent analysis, because the majority recognizes where
Congress sets out their intent, the Court must follow; however, the
majority fails to accomplish this. 151 Justice Kennedy frames the rule
that the Court can choose among "constructions which are 'fairly
possible,"' and given two equally plausible interpretations should
choose the one that avoids a constitutional question.1 52 However,
Justice Kennedy does not think the majority has a plausible reading
of the statute, because their reading goes against the stated
Congressional purpose. 53 He posits that the majority has undertaken
to amend the statute to impose a six-month limit for the government
to proceed with deportation, and that this amendment "defeats the
statutory purpose and design."' 54 Justice Kennedy points out that
other sections of 8 U.S.C § 1231 impose a reasonable time period
requirement for removal, but the section in question does not, and
147. Id. at 706.
148. Id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163 (1952)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 706-07.
151. Id. at 707.
152. Id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
this omission should not be seen as meaning the writers of the statute
were not intending to impose a reasonable time period requirement in
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).' 55
Justice Kennedy then argues that the six month requirement the
majority imposes makes the purpose of the statute, to protect the
community, "ineffective."1 56 Justice Kennedy notes that Congress
has made special provisions for aliens who are removable but cannot
be removed, and who need not be detained, allowing them to have
jobs "illustrates a balance in statutory design."' 157 Justice Kennedy
says the majority makes the other side of the balance, detaining some
aliens to protect the community, meaningless with this ruling. 158
Justice Kennedy concedes that the majority is correct in that the
Court can limit a statute that raises constitutional questions, but it
should only do so "in aid of the statutory purpose."' 59 Here, Justice
Kennedy argues, the statute gives the attorney general factors to look
at to continue detainment of the alien, but the Court makes those
factors irrelevant with this decision.' 60
Justice Kennedy states the majority has left two possible
interpretations of the statute: 1) the majority rule applies to both
aliens who are inadmissible at the border and those aliens in the
United States who are ordered removed; or 2) removable aliens
should be treated differently.' 6' Justice Kennedy feels it is not a
correct interpretation of the statute to state that time limits apply
differently to the two classes, but this is what the majority has
ruled. 162 He points out that Congress has great Legislative Branch
authority over immigration matters, so, "it is reasonable to assume
then... when Congress provided for detention 'beyond the removal
period,' it exercised its considerable power over immigration" and
155. Id. at 708.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (noting that the fact an alien cannot be deported does not make him any
less of a danger).
159. Id. at 710.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 710-11.
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allowed the Attorney General the power to detain admissible and
removable aliens for as long as they are either at risk to flee or a
danger to the community.163 Justice Kennedy states that in the
instant case, the Court is upsetting the balance of powers, that
judicial orders releasing removable aliens can cloud the United States
vision of a united immigration policy. 1
64
Justice Kennedy then argues that the cases the Court relies on to
support the six-month presumption are not applicable. 165 The dissent
argues the six month period "bears no particular relationship to how
long it now takes to deport any group of aliens, or, for that matter,
how long it took in the past to remove." 166 The instant case itself
demonstrates that it can take years to negotiate repatriation.
67
Justice Kennedy states the negative effects of the six-month period: It
will take from Executive Branch efforts to negotiate repatriations,
and it may encourage aliens not to cooperate in repatriations, so their
removal will not seem foreseeable and they will be released.
168
Justice Kennedy also argues that the danger from aliens released
because of mandatory release dates is clear, and government statistics
show "high recidivism rates for released aliens."' 69  The dissent
points out the largest danger may come from "[u]nderworld and
terrorist links [between a removable alien and his associates that] are
subtle and may be overseas, beyond our jurisdiction to impose felony
charges."' 17
0
163. Id. at 711.
164. Id. at 711-12 (noting that the orders could also interfere with foreign
relations, where the United States is trying to get aliens sent back to their home
country). Justice Kennedy feels that after six months, the majority is handing the
Judicial Branch power over foreign relations, which he believes is a dangerous
move. Id.
165. Id. at 712.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 712-13.
168. Id. at 713.
169. Id. Justice Kennedy points out the fact that although an alien has served a
sentence, this does not mean they are no longer a risk. Id.
170. Id. at 714. In light of September 11, 2001, Justice Kennedy's comments
seem particularly timely and prescient. See Antiterrorism Legislation Gains
Momentum in Both Chambers; Lawmakers Offer Assorted Stand-Alone Bills,
Interpreter Releases, Oct, 2001. A great fear would be if a removable alien was
Justice Kennedy sees a paradox in the majority's reasoning: The
Court's ruling does not apply to an alien who enters "by fraud or
stealth", but does apply to an alien who enters legally and once in the
United States commits a removable act.' 71 Justice Kennedy fails to
see why the rationale only applies to the first alien. 172 He also feels
the consideration of the "reasonable forseeability of removal" of the
alien the majority allows should not be a judicial question. 173 Justice
Kennedy notes, "[t]he majority does say the release of terrorists or
other 'special circumstances' might justify 'heightened deference to
the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of
national security. "'174 Justice Kennedy also notes the majority uses
an "assessment of risk" test, but the statute cannot allow the Attorney
General to do the same. 175
Justice Kennedy sees a potential problem: often other countries
will not allow dangerous criminals back into their country, so the
most dangerous criminals are the ones most likely to be released,
because there is no reasonable forseeability they are going to be
repatriated. 7 6 The dissent feels the majority rule might extend to
people who illegally or fraudulently enter the United States, and
convicted of a crime and did have terrorist links outside of our country, but was
unable to be deported. Id. The hands of the government are tied, because the
majority ruling in the instant case mandates release if removal is not foreseeable





174. Id. at 714-15. Justice Kennedy's noting of this facet of the majority
opinion is especially relevant in a post-September 11 th world. See Antiterrorism
Legislation Gains Momentum in Both Chambers; Lawmakers Offer Assorted
Stand-Alone Bills; Interpreter Releases, Oct, 2001; Hearing on Immigration
Detention Policy Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Margaret H. Taylor,
Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law) (for discussions of the
consideration of Zadvydas v. Davis in adopting new legislation in a post-September
11 th world).
175. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 715.
176. Id. (giving an example of a 9th Circuit case where such a circumstance
occurred).
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allow them to be set free if there is no reasonable belief the
government is working towards getting them sent back.'77 Justice
Kennedy also notes that, "[t]he reason detention is permitted at all is
that a removable alien does not have the same liberty interest as a
citizen does," but he feels the majority fails to recognize this. 178 He
explains that this is why if an alien violates his release terms, he is
ordered to be detained again. 179 Justice Kennedy then states he feels
that the Court, with its decision, is getting too far involved in foreign
policy. 180
Justice Kennedy then transitions by saying aliens are entitled to
the protection of the Due Process Clause, which "includes protection
against unlawful or arbitrary personal restraint or detention."181
However, an alien's right to liberty is subject to limitations and
conditions that a United States citizen's rights are not subject to. 182
At a deportation hearing, the government must show by clear and
convincing evidence that an alien should be deported and the alien is
given the right to appeal. 183 Justice Kennedy feels this gives the
aliens "substantial procedural safeguards."'1 84  Justice Kennedy
suggests that aliens who have not entered the United States are
distinguished from those who have: "[t]hey are removable, and their
rights must be defined in accordance with that status." 185  Once
ordered to be removed, Justice Kennedy states that no alien has the
right to remain in the United States. 86 He feels the Court has given
more rights to aliens who were admitted into the United States than
177. Id. at 716 (giving the example of Rosales-Garcia v. Holland case, where a
circumstance similar to his example occurred) (citing Rosales-Garcia v. Holland,
238 F.3d 704, 705 (5th Cir. 2001)).
178. Id. at 717.
179. Id. at 717-18.
180. Id. at 718.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
183. Id. at 718-19 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2000); 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(5) (2000)).
184. Id. at 719.
185. Id. at 720.
186. Id.
to those "stopped at the border." '87  Justice Kennedy believes
admitted aliens are entitled to a deportation hearing because they
have an interest in staying, while aliens who never entered do not
have this interest.1 88 Additionally, both types of aliens "are entitled
to be free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious."' 89 Justice
Kennedy concludes that if the alien is detained incident to their
removal, the detention cannot be punishment.' 90 To detain an alien
to keep them from fleeing or because it is determined they are a
danger to the community is not "arbitrary or capricious." 191
Justice Kennedy says when deciding whether the due process
rights of removable aliens have been violated, you must ask "whether
there are adequate procedures to review their cases, allowing persons
once subject to detention to show that through rehabilitation, new
appreciation of their responsibilities, or under other standards, they
no longer present special risks or danger if put at large."' 192 The
Attorney General can use leeway given by the INA to "ensure
fairness and regularity in INS detention decisions."' 93  A post-
custody review is allowed before the ninety-day period expires.'
94
The alien can present information to support their release and the
district director can personally evaluate the alien.'9 5 At the end of the
ninety-day period, an alien transferred to the detention unit at INS
headquarters will have an initial custody review within three
months. 196
187. Id.





193. Id. at 722.
194. Id. at 720-2 1.
195. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2002)).
196. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(k)(2)(ii) (2002) and giving a full explanation
of INS detention policy and review).
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Justice Kennedy analogizes INS detention decisions to parole
revocation hearings.'9 7 Justice Kennedy feels that the fact the alien
carries the burden of proving their detention is no longer justified is
not unfair. 198 Justice Kennedy states "aliens in the instant cases have
notice ... that the INA imposes as a consequence of the commission
of certain crimes not only deportation but also the possibility of
continued detention in cases where deportation is not immediately
feasible." 199
Justice Kennedy feels that the aliens have the due process right to
have the INS conduct review by procedures already laid out in the
statute.200  Believing that the majority is focusing on the wrong
factors in allowing review of INS hearings when they zero in on
"status repatriation negotiations," 20 1 Justice Kennedy feels that they
should focus on flight risk or danger to the community. 20 2 Justice
Kennedy believes the majority decision takes away Executive Branch
primacy in foreign affairs because decisions are subject to review by
courts; 20 3 thereby becoming an improper judicial function. 20 4 Justice
Kennedy concludes by saying the Court should have reversed the
Ninth Circuit's ruling on the Ma case, and upheld the Fifth Circuit's
decision on the Zadvydas v. Davis case.20 5
IV. IMPACT
The ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas v.
Davis20 6 have already been, and will continue to be, far reaching.20 7
197. Id. at 723 (citing Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (where the
Court ruled that a parole revocation review process could be done by a neutral
administrative official).
198. Id. at 723-24.
199. Id. at 724.
200. Id.





206. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
With the events of September 11, 2001, the ramifications of the
decision would appear to be even more far reaching than previously
thought.2 °8 At the time the decision came down, articles noted that
some lawyers thought Zadvydas v. Davis established "a somewhat
vague standard" and would be a "looming issue" in the coming
years. 209 Since the events of September 11, 2001, the Zadvydas v.
Davis ruling has become timely. In particular, the Court's ruling that
special circumstances, such as terrorism, can justify holding an
immigrant beyond the ninety day period has become more
important.21 0
207. See State Dept. Plans to Assist INS in Repatriating Detained Criminal
Aliens After Zadvydas, Interpreter Releases, Aug. 2001 (detailing a State
Department cable sent in early August, 2001 to their diplomatic and consular posts
explaining the impact of the Zadvydas v. Davis decision and that the State
Department will make full efforts to assist the Department of Justice in their
repatriation efforts. The cable also requires that State Department employees must
step up their efforts to aid repatriation of aliens ordered removed from the United
States).
208. See Review of Dep't of Justice Immigration Detention Policies: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Margaret'H. Taylor, Professor of Law,
Wake Forest University School of Law) (discussing the Immigration and
Naturalization Services' detention policy, the impact of the Zadvydas v. Davis case
on INS detention policy, and how post-September 11 th, in the rush to be tough on
immigration, the INS must remember the Zadvydas v. Davis decision and not
violate the due process rights of immigrants).
209. Maria Coyle, Supreme Court Trims Congress' Sails on Immigration
Control, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., July 11, 2001, at 10 (outlining the Court's ruling
in Zadvydas v. Davis and the legal community's opinion of the potential impact of
the decision); See also John Council & Jonathan Ringel, Immigrants Can't Linger
in Limbo Indefinitely, TEX. LAWYER, July 9, 2001, at 5 (detailing the response of an
immigration lawyer and an INS agent to the Zadvydas v. Davis decision).
210. See Mary Jacoby, Al-Najjar to Appeal Deportation Order to Supreme
Court, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at 4A (detailing the plight of Mazen
Al-Najjar, an alien ordered deported, who the government wants to keep in custody
because of his alleged ties to terrorist groups. The justification given for holding
Najjar was the Court's ruling in Zadvydas that special circumstances, such as
terrorist ties, can justify holding an alien ordered deported indefinitely when no
country will take him. The 11 th Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that Al-
Najjir cannot be detained while awaiting deportation). For further discussion of the
Zadyvdas v. Davis case and its impact, see, e.g., Micah Herzig, Is Korematsu Good
Law in the Face of Terrorism? Procedural Due Process in the Security Versus
Liberty Debate, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 685 (2002); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining The
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A. Legislative Impact
The most clear legislative impact of the Zadvydas v. Davis
decision is the anti-terrorism legislation passed after September 11,
2001, the USA Patriot Act ("Act").21' Many commentators who
were brought to Congress to testify about proposed anti-terrorism
legislation mentioned Zadvydas v. Davis.212 To examine the Act, is it
helpful to study, "how the Act balances the need for a more powerful
executive to fight terrorism with congressional and judicial oversight
to protect individual rights." 213 The Act allows indefinite detention
of aliens whose repatriation is not reasonably foreseeable.21 4 This
End Of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002); Stacy J. Borisov, Give
Me Liberty Or Give Me Deportation: The Indefinite Detention of Non-Removable,
Criminal Aliens, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 183 (2001); David A. Martin,
Graduated Application Of Constitutional Protections For Aliens: The Real
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 47 (2001); Developments in the
Law: The Law of Prisons, supra note 3; Leading Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 366
(2001).
211. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
212. See, e.g., Review of the Dep't of Justice Immigration Detention Policy
Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Margaret H. Taylor, Professor of
Law, Wake Forest University School of Law) (mentioning Zadvydas v. Davis in the
context of how aliens are afforded due process rights under our Constitution, and
that potential legislation must note this), Hearing on Civil Liberties and Proposed
Anti-Terrorism Legislation Before the Senate. Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Federalism and Property Rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(2001) (statement of Professor David Cole) (mentioning Zadvydas v. Davis in the
context of proposed legislation which would allow the INS to detain deportable
aliens indefinitely. Cole reminds the committee that Zadvydas v. Davis has
imposed a six-month post detention removal period in which the alien must have a
reasonable possibility of being deported, or be released), Hearing on the
Constitutionality of Various Provisions of the Proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001
before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of
Douglas W. Kmiec, Dean of the Law School of The Catholic University of
America in Washington, D.C.) (mentioning Zadvydas v. Davis in the context of
stating that indefinite detention is not ruled out by Zadvydas v. Davis, "where
dangerousness is accompanied by special circumstance," which means the
proposed legislation is indeed constitutional).
213. Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Developments: USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV.
J. ON LEGIs. 435, 436 (2002).
214. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), 115 Stat. 272, 351
(2001).
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would seem to be in clear defiance of the Court's ruling in Zadvydas
v. Davis.2" 5 In addition, the Act also allows the INS to detain aliens
who were not ordered deported.21 6 The Act also "does not require an
objective showing that the individual poses a danger to the
community[;] it relies instead on the Attorney General's
determination that he has 'reasonable grounds' to believe an
immigrant is engaged in terrorist activity." 217 These provisions of the
Act raise serious constitutional questions when examined in light of
the Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis. In future anti-terrorist
acts, members of Congress must keep in mind the ruling in Zadvydas
v. Davis to balance their legislation, and make sure it is constitutional
while still having the desired effect of preventing terrorism. Overall,
the legislative impact of the decision in the instant case appears to be
important and weighty.
B. Judicial Impact
The most obvious judicial impact of the Zadvydas v. Davis
decision is the lawsuits of immigrants ordered detained and who have
been detained beyond the six-month period allowed in the decision.
215. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (holding:
We ... have reason to believe... that Congress... doubted
the Constitutionality of detention for more than six months.
Consequently . . . we recognize that period. After this 6-
month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond
with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for
detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-
removal confinement grows, what counts as the "reasonably
foreseeable future" conversely would have to shrink .... [a]n
alien may be held in confinement until it has been
determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future) (citation omitted).
216. See Developments in the Law: Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite
Detention of Deportable Aliens, supra note 36, at 1935 (citing USA Patriot Act §
412(a)). The article argues that though some think the Court's language in
Zadvydas about terrorism and special justifications for detention signals this
portion of the Patriot Act is constitutional, that language was dictum, and therefore
the provision's constitutionality is debatable. See id. at 1936.
217. Id.
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Those immigrants, with the handing down of the decision,
immediately had the right to file lawsuits, claiming there was no
reasonable belief that they would ever be deported and thus should be
released. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court ruled that federal habeas
courts have the right to hear these cases.218 Therefore, it is to be
expected that the caseload in federal habeas courts, district courts and
courts of appeal will increase.219
218. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 699-702.
219. The Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have actually extended the
rights afforded to detained aliens in Zadvydas v. Davis. See Molly McDonough,
Immigrants Win Right to Hearings: Circuits Reject Blanket Policy of Detention,
ABA J. E-REPORTS, Jan. 11, 2002, at E-Report 7. In Kim v. Ziglar, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that:
Following the approach of the Zadvydas majority, we thus
conclude that the government has not provided a "special
justification" for no-bail civil detention sufficient to
overcome a lawful permanent resident alien's liberty interest
on an individualized determination of flight risk and
dangerousness. It is sufficient for our purposes to rely on the
reasoning of the majority in Zadvydas. But we note that §
1226(c) also cannot pass constitutional muster under the
alternative analysis set forth by Justice Kennedy in that case.
Kim v. Zilgar, 276 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that even under the stricter analysis proposed in Justice Kennedy's dissent,
under Zadvydas v. Davis, aliens waiting to be deported are entitled to a bail
hearing. See id. In another Ninth Circuit case, the Ninth Circuit reasoning under
Zadvydas v. Davis held that an immigrant never legally admitted into the United
States could not be held indefinitely while awaiting deportation, if deportation
appears unlikely. Xi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 298
F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Angela Watercutter, Court Sets Limits On
Detention of Migrants, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 2, 2002, at A4
(distinguishing Xi from Zadvydas v. Davis, explaining that in applying Zadyvdas v.
Davis, the Xi court gives greater rights than Zadvydas v. Davis afforded). In Patel
v. Zemski, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the government could not
indefinitely detain individuals waiting to be deported unless those individuals are
given an in "individualized hearing" to determine that they are indeed a flight risk
or a danger to the community. Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 312 (3rd Cir. 2001).
However, in the wake of the Zadvydas decision, the Court's ruling has been
weakened by lower federal courts who are declining to extend and distinguishing
the decision from cases they face. See, e.g., Soto Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 228
F.Supp.2d 566, 571 (M.D.Pa. 2002) (declined to extend Zadvydas on the grounds
that the Petitioner never entered the United States, and Ma and Zadvydas had); Al
Najjar, 186 at 1243-44 (holding that Zadvydas governs how long detention can be
forced on aliens the INS is seeking to deport, and declining to extend Zadvydas to
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An example of the judicial impact is the case of Mazen Al-Najjar, a
former University of South Florida professor who battled the
government in court to stay out of prison while he fought his
deportation order. 220 Al-Najjar was ordered released while he fought
his deportation. 221 However, the government appealed, arguing that
special circumstances, Al-Najjar's possible terrorist ties, should have
allowed for his continued detention.222 The government's special
circumstances argument is a result of Zadvydas v. Davis, as there the
Court ruled that an immigrant's indefinite detention could be justified
only by special circumstances, which must be pled and proven by the
government.223 This case is but one example of the possible drawn
out legal battles that can result from the Court's ruling in Zadvydas v.
Davis.
224
cover the conditions the aliens face while waiting for deportation); Badio v. United
States, 172 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1204 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding that Zadvydas governs
"post-removal-period detention . . . " and declining to extend Zadvydas to cover
"pre-removal-order detentions... ") ; Fernandez-Fajardo v. I.N.S., 193 F.Supp.2d
877, 885 (M.D. La. 2001) (holding that Zadvydas applies to those who have
actually entered the United States, and declining to extend Zadvydas to those who
are detained at the border); Lozano-Castaneda v. Garcia, -- F.Supp.2d --, 2002 WL
31939264, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2002) (saying that a test set forth in Salerno
rather than the Zadvydas decision should be applied to the Petitioner); Herrero-
Rodriguez v. Bailey, 237 F.Supp.2d 543, 547 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that Zadvydas
applies to deportable aliens, and declining to extend Zadvydas to govern
inadmissible aliens rights).
220. See Jacoby, supra note 210.
221. See id.
222. See id. Indeed, the government won the argument in 2002, when a
district court judge denied Al-Najjar's writ of habeas corpus which requested he be
released while awaiting removal. A1-Najjar v. Ashcroft, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1235
(S.D. Fla. 2002).
223. See Jacoby, supra note 210. Mr. Al-Najjar was deported by the United
States and left in Beirut, Lebanon on August 24, 2002. Bassem Mroue, Lebanon
Criticizes U.S. Deportation of Tampa Palestinian Prof, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Aug. 28, 2002. Mr. Al-Najjar was detained for three and a half years
total while awaiting his deportation. Across the Nation: Professor Suspected Of
Ties To Terrorism Deported To Beirut, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 25, 2002, at 13.
224. See Ninth Circuit Issues Amended Detention Ruling in the Wake of
Zadvydas, 78 No.30 Interpreter Releases, 1261 (Aug. 2001) (Explaining how the
Ninth Circuit was forced to reconsider their decision in two prior rulings, Ma v.
Ashcroft and Ma v. Reno, as a result of the Zadvydas v. Davis decision). The Ninth
Circuit ruled that in light of Zadvydas v. Davis, they would hold with their earlier
decision to release Ma because there was no reasonable belief he would be
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C. Administrative Impact
There is a case decided subsequent to Zadvydas v. Davis which
illustrates the difficulty of the decision for administrative bodies.2 2 5
Reynero Arteago Carballo was a Cuban immigrant convicted of
many crimes in the United States, and ordered deported once he had
served his sentence for 1983 conviction for attempted first degree
murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and robbery. 226
Upon Carballo's release from prison, he was detained in a federal
corrections institute. 227 While at the Federal Corrections institute,
Carballo has "committed assault, threatened bodily harm to a staff
member, trespassed in an unauthorized area, and possessed marijuana
while in federal custody." 228 The INS annually reviewed Carballo's
case, but has each time denied him parole, finding he is a continued
deported to his home country, and he had been held far beyond the statutory period.
See Id. Indeed, the INS embroiled in controversy over whether it is "systematically
thwarting" the Court's holding in Zadvydas v. Davis. Elizabeth Amon, INS Flouts
Court on Prisoners, Critics Say: Agency Loses One Case, Faces New Suit, THE
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at Col. 4. A class action petition filed in Chicago by
the Midwest Immigrant and Human Rights Center (Hmaidan v. Ashcroft, No.
02CV5097 (July 25, 2002)) claims the INS is ignoring Zadvydas v. Davis, that
immigration attorneys are being forced to file habeas petitions for aliens who
should automatically be released under the rules set forth in Zadvydas v. Davis. Id.
The INS has denied the allegations. Id. However, the Petitioners in the class
action have strong support in the recent case of Seretse-Khama v. Aschcroft. No.
Civ.A. 020955JDB, 2002 WL 1711751 (D.D.C. July 22, 2002). In Seretse-Khama,
a United States District Court Judge, John Bates, freed Donald Seretse-Khama,
who was held indefinitely by the INS for four years after serving out his sentence
for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute while the INS tried to deport him.
Id. at *2-*3. Though Liberia (Seretse-Khama's home country) patently refused to
issue him travel documents, the INS continued to hold him. Id. at *2-*4. Judge
Bates found the INS's assertions that Seretse-Khama was soon to be deported,
"simply, and blatantly, false." Id. at *9. Cases like Seretse-Khama's and others,
like Mohammed Nofal (a Palestinian who has been awaiting deportation by the INS
since 1998, and whose deportation seems unlikely) will provide the class action
filed with strong evidence of INS noncompliance with Zadvydas v. Davis. For
Some, Deportation Takes Years, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 10, 2001, at A2.
225. See Alien's Successive Habeas Petition Not Saved by Zadvydas, 78 No.




228. Id. at 1638.
danger to our society, in light of his convictions, and in light of his
continued violent nature in prison.229 Carballo filed a writ of habeas
corpus, which was denied by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, who
relied heavily on the standards laid out in the Shaugnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei case in ruling that the INS was justified in its
continued detention of Carballo. 230 With the decision in Zadvydas v.
Davis, the Sixth Circuit was forced to reconsider their decision on
whether the INS was lawfully detaining Carballo.231 Ultimately, the
Sixth Circuit decided that Carballo's continued detention was
justified even under the Supreme Court's new ruling in Zadvydas v.
Davis.232
The situation which arose with the INS' detention of Carballo is
illustrative of a greater impact the Zadvydas v. Davis ruling will have
on administrative law. Under the Court's old rulings, the INS's
continued detention of Carballo, and many other immigrants, was
considered justified. However, with the Zadvydas v. Davis decision,
the INS has to reconsider the detention decisions they are making.
The INS as an administrative body has to take note of whether, under
Zadvydas v. Davis, they have a reasonable belief they are going to be
able to deport an alien when they have held the alien beyond the
statutory period. This will potentially force the INS to reconsider the
cases of many aliens they have held far beyond the statutory period.
In addition, the INS must adopt new standards for detentions that
begin after the Zadvydas v. Davis ruling, so the agency's decisions on
whether or not to detain an alien beyond the statutory period will not
be overturned by a Court of Appeals. The potential for backlog and




231. Id.; Carballo v. Luttrell, No.99-5698, 2001 WL 1194699 (6th Cir. 2001).
232. See Alien's Habeas Petition, supra note 225, at 1638.
233. Further, in his dissent, Justice Kennedy discusses a likely impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis: aliens ordered detained will not cooperate with authorities in
getting themselves returned to their home country. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 713 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argues, logically, that
it would be in the best interest of the alien ordered removed not to cooperate,
because that will make it highly unforeseeable that they are going to be deported.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in the Zadvydas v. Davis case has
ramifications that are far more reaching than the decision's effect on
Mr. Zadvydas and Mr. Ma. The decision affects how thousands of
aliens convicted of crimes, ordered deported and awaiting removal
will be treated. The majority and both dissents raised important
issues and made strong arguments for the conclusion they would
have liked in the case. Ultimately, the majority's more lenient view
of the Due Process Clause and the rights aliens ordered deported
should be given won out. With the events of September 11, 2001, the
decision in this case becomes more timely. The majority refused to
raise the issue of how suspected terrorists should be treated in
deportation situations, and the dissenting opinions clearly thought
this was a mistake. Returning to the hypothetical posed at the
beginning of this article, the reality of this decision's real world
impact is startlingly clear. If your child is murdered by a resident
alien and our government is unable to deport the murderer after their
sentence is served, how would you feel if that person was released
back onto your streets, in your neighborhood? From the standpoint
of the murderer, who has served their sentence, is it fair to continue
to detain them? How should courts balance the safety interest of the
community at large with the liberty interests of the criminal? The
path lower courts take in interpreting the standard laid out in
Zadvydas v. Davis could very well affect our national security and
how this hypothetical plays out.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). If it is unforeseeable that alien could be deported,
once they have been held for six months, they will have to be released under the
reasoning of the instant case. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy's
argument is well-reasoned. Given the choice of being deported back to a country
they left, or not cooperating and being allowed to remain in the United States, it
seems highly likely that an alien would chose the latter option.
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